To vote for LoP or let presidential runner-up join Parliament?
Already, the role of LoP is diminished by its equal status to that of a cabinet minister. Even elevating the LoP to the level of Prime Minister wouldn’t resolve this issue.
By Musa Mugoya
Richard Lumu, MP for Mityana South, is pushing for changes in the appointment of the Leader of Opposition (LOP) in Parliament, suggesting a shift from the current system.
Since the return to multiparty politics in 2006, Uganda’s Constitution has provided for the office of the LOP under Article 82A.
This article mandates Parliament to enact laws that define how the LOP is chosen, the office's roles and functions, and its privileges.
Accordingly, the Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Act, 2006 was passed, with Section 6B (1) stating that the LOP is elected by the opposition party with the greatest numerical strength in Parliament.
It also allows for consultations with other opposition parties and independent MPs, as noted in Section 6B (2).
Before addressing Lumu’s proposal, it’s essential to recognize that the current law is inherently flawed.
First, why should an opposition political party consult independent MPs in electing the LoP? Secondly, it institutionalises how the leading opposition party gets the LOP but fails to impose a similar system on the ruling party for key government appointments like the Prime Minister.
This discrepancy is troubling, especially when the LOP, who leads the shadow cabinet, is elected, while the Prime Minister is simply appointed.
Moreover, Section 6D of the Act equates the LOP’s status to that of a cabinet minister, even though the LOP should logically be at the same level as the Prime Minister, given that both lead their respective sides of Parliament.
Despite this, Lumu’s proposed amendment would require the leading opposition party to nominate three of its members of Parliament and allow the entire opposition MPs to vote for their preferred LOP. With all due respect to Lumu, his proposal reflects a limited understanding of the multiparty political system as outlined in Uganda’s Constitution.
Uganda’s opposition leader is chosen on the same day as the President, meaning the LOP leads the parliamentary business of his or her political party.
Just as the Prime Minister leads the government’s (ruling political party’s) parliamentary business, essentially, the LOP’s role is tied to their political party’s mandate, not the opposition as a whole.
Therefore, Lumu’s suggestion risks diluting the integrity of multiparty politics by allowing other parties to interfere in the internal affairs of the leading opposition party. This is a dangerous precedent.
It's worth noting that the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Uganda’s leading opposition party after the 2006 elections, did conduct a vote for the LoP.
Senior leaders, including Prof Ogenga Latigo and the late Sam Njuba, contested, with Latigo emerging victorious after a vote by FDC’s 39 MPs and its National Executive Committee (NEC). However, this process, while democratic, also risked internal divisions.
A candidate who lacked a strong working relationship with the party president could win the vote.
In fact, after the 2006 election, FDC moved away from internal LOP elections. For the next two parliamentary terms, the LOP was appointed by the party president and approved by NEC, a process designed to maintain internal unity.
Be that as it may, some influential voices such as the Katikiro of Buganda have suggested amending the law to allow the runner-up in a presidential election to join Parliament and automatically become LOP. I respectfully disagree.
This approach might work in a purely parliamentary system, but Uganda’s hybrid presidential-parliamentary system would only be weakened by this change.
For instance, where does the proposal leave the third, fourth, and fifth presidential candidates with, say, 10%, 8%, and 5% of the vote, respectively?
Already, the role of LoP is diminished by its equal status to that of a cabinet minister. Even elevating the LoP to the level of Prime Minister wouldn’t resolve this issue.
Why should a presidential candidate who garnered significant national support be reduced to debating with the President’s appointees in Parliament? It makes little political sense and undermines the candidate and his political party's national mandate.
This is precisely why Dr Kizza Besigye declined to serve as LOP after the 2006 elections. Before the vote between Prof Latigo and Sam Njuba, Besigye reportedly refused calls for Njuba to step aside so he could stand as Member of Parliament for Kyadondo East and consequently take the LoP role. Besigye understood the limitations of such a position.
A better solution would be to adopt an indirect electoral system for both the President and Parliament. Under this model, political parties would compete nationally, and any presidential candidate that garners at least 1% of the vote would earn representation in Parliament.
The party with the most votes would form the government, and its leader would serve as both President and Member of Parliament. The party that emerges second would take the minority position—leading the opposition.
This system would strengthen political parties, encourage national unity, and promote issue-based competition while reducing the usual tensions between presidential and parliamentary leadership; it would also completely eliminate the common tension between the LOP and his or her party president since all party leaders or presidential candidates would be in Parliament.
Uganda’s multiparty democracy is still evolving, and reform is necessary. However, Lumu’s proposal to allow broader voting for the LOP within the opposition is misguided —and the suggestion that only the presidential runner-up should join Parliament and automatically become LOP may not offer the most appropriate solution to our governance challenges.
